Chinese student migration, gender and family by Kajanus, Anni
  
Anni Kajanus 









Originally published in Kajanus, Anni (2015) Chinese student migration, gender and family. 
Palgrave studies on Chinese education in a global perspective. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 
UK. ISBN 9781137509093  
 
© 2015 The Author 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64177/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 5. Leftover women 
On a Saturday afternoon just before the Spring Festival, Helen sits in a teahouse in one of Beijing’s 
trendy neighbourhoods. Windows of the teahouse are decorated with cardboard cut-out hearts, 
matching the red of the faux-leather sofas. The sound system plays Chinese and Western love songs 
and waiters in long aprons carry trays of hot chocolate. The teahouse sets a youthful backdrop for 
the match-making event organized by Touyuan dating agency. Middle aged men in their tailored 
slacks and blouson jackets and thirty-something women in jeans and knee-high boots sip on their 
drinks, waiting for the matchmaker to pair them up. Helen shakes hands with the man guided to her 
table. Before their 20 minutes are up, the couple have covered their respective education levels, 
occupations, income and possessions, age, height and family backgrounds. They then have the 
choice of exchanging contact details or moving on to the next candidate. The upcoming Spring 
Festival with the customary hometown visit puts extra pressure on many of the singletons taking 
part in the event, as they dread the urges and questions from worried parents. In Helen’s case the 
parents' worry is somewhat justified. A 31-year-old professional woman with an overseas master’s 
degree, a decent salary and good career prospects, she has several things working against her in the 
urban Chinese marriage market. In popular discourse she is called shengnü, a leftover woman – a 
woman of three highs (sangaonü): high education, high salary, and high professional status, who is 
well over the ideal marriage age for urban Chinese women and has difficulties finding a suitable 
husband. As is well known, the family planning policies of the past four decades have resulted in a 
high sex ratio and the problem of involuntary rural bachelorhood has been addressed by both 
researchers and worried policy makers (Chao 2005; Edlund et al. 2013; Hudson and den Boer 2004; 
Ross 2010; Tucker et al. 2005; Tucker et al. 2009; Zhao 2003). How does it then occur that women 
whose lives are marked by success in all other areas have difficulties finding a husband? 
 Béarn bachelors and Chinese leftover women 
In this analysis of the urban Chinese marriage market and the way the student migrants are part of 
its transformation, I draw from Bourdieu’s (2007) analysis of non-marriage in post-war rural 
France. To summarise very briefly, Bourdieu discusses the problem of involuntary bachelorhood in 
his native rural Béarn after the war. The eldest sons, the primary inheritors of the family property, 
used to be at the top of the marriage market and finding an appropriate match was of primary 
concern for the continuity of the patrimony. The ideal was to marry a woman who could bring 
enough dowry to provide for the marriage of the other siblings, but not too much to pose too high a 
risk in the occurrence on repayment, that is, if the marriage broke down before any children had 
been born. This logic collapsed in a process that started with economic changes. Because of the 
post-WW1 inflation, no-one could pay dowries that would match the value of the patrimony. The 
link between marriage and land was weakened, and it became more a matter of social status and 
lifestyle. Moreover, as the rural economy became more dependent on the urban economy, and the 
development of transport and education made the population more integrated, a unification of 
symbolic markets followed. This was not an egalitarian process, but dominated by urban views and 
devalued the ‘peasant way of life’. Unlike women and younger sons, the eldest sons remained 
attached to the land and could not take up the new opportunities of education and employment in 
the urban areas, or adapt the new lifestyles. Parental authority over marriages declined and 
courtship was left to individual initiative. The eldest sons now had two things working against 
them. The land had become a burden because women were reluctant to attach themselves to a 
lifetime of obligations to the parents-in-law and the patrimony. What is more, the eldest sons 
embodied the devalued ‘peasant way of life’ in their habitus and bodily hexis, which made it even 
more difficult to attract a bride. 
The book Bachelors’ Ball (2007) is a republication of three works (originally published in 1962, 
 1972 and 1989 respectively), drawing together Bourdieu’s treatment of the subject from three 
paradigms, first using structuralist approach, then his theory of practice (habitus), and finally the 
symbolic market. He identifies the two fundamental oppositions, women vs. men and great houses 
vs. small houses, at the basis of the values marriage holds up in rural Béarn: male supremacy and 
primogeniture (protection of the patrimony). He then argues that these are embedded in people’s 
matrimonial strategies through their habitus, and even in the midst of social change, people’s 
manoeuvring follows these underlining principles learned in childhood. Finally, he shows how 
symbolic change drives the process. Bourdieu argues that the non-marriage of the eldest sons, as 
detrimental as it was to the ‘peasant way of life’, upheld the important cultural principles of male 
supremacy and primogeniture.   
The case of the Béarn bachelors shows that in the midst of sociocultural change a part of the 
population whose position is produced by the old system and who are unable to fit the standards of 
marriageability in the current system, can be caught in involuntary non-marriage (for another 
account, see Scheper-Hughes 1979). This is the case for the Chinese bachelors at the bottom end of 
the marriage market: men from poor rural families, those living in underdeveloped regions and low 
paid migrant workers in the cities. A long-standing patriarchal belief in the Chinese marriage 
market is that a man’s socioeconomic position should be similar or higher than a woman’s. This 
logic is coupled with the high sex ratio and the recent sociocultural transformations, which include 
later marriage age and the higher education level of young women and their higher earning power 
that increase the value of daughters to their natal families. As a result, the power in marriage 
negotiations has shifted in favour of women and their families (Yan 2003, 2009). Young women in 
the middle and bottom ranges of the marriage market hierarchy are the main beneficiaries of the 
intensified practice of spatial and socioeconomic hypergamy. As they ‘marry up’, the men at the 
bottom of the hierarchy have difficulty finding a wife.  
In the urban areas where sex ratio is smaller, a different problem arises. Having grown up as the 
 single child of their parents, young women of marrying age have had similar support and 
opportunities as men. Patriliny, one of the central values marriage has upheld in China, has become 
unsustainable in urban areas after the one child policy, and its main institutions: inheritance, 
patrilocality and ancestor worship, have largely been discontinued. Marriage has become more 
about the conjugal couple than the lineage. Patriarchy, a general model of male supremacy that 
encompasses patrilineage and its institutions, as well as the existential, asymmetrical and 
hierarchical gender model, is the second principal value upheld by marriage, and has also been 
undermined with the increase of youth autonomy in general, and in spouse selection in particular 
(Jankowiak 1993; Yan 2003). But here is the paradox, the value of male supremacy is still being 
upheld, at least at the level of an ideal model. Apart from a few exceptions, all female student 
migrants I knew hoped to marry a man of a similar or preferably higher socioeconomic status, and 
many considered a good marriage instrumental not only to their emotional, but also material well-
being. As I was explained to: ‘You marry a chicken, you follow the chicken, marry a dog, follow 
the dog’ (Jia ji sui ji, jia gou sui gou). Being so outstanding (youxiu) themselves, the ‘leftover 
women’ want a man of matching ability (nengli). This sets high, at times impossible, standards for 
the men they are willing to marry. For men, on the other hand, the ideal is to marry a woman whose 
objective qualities are as high as possible in absolute terms, while not too high relative to their own.  
The current imbalance in the Chinese marriage market bears some resemblance to what Bourdieu 
describes in post-war rural Béarn. Change in social practices and values challenge the economic and 
the value base of marriage. But unlike the Béarn bachelors, the Chinese ‘leftover women’, and 
especially the student migrants, are among the instigators of the unification of the symbolic 
markets. Their challenge is to negotiate the different symbolic resources, in other words values and 
ideas, that at times are in conflict with each other and do not fit well with the current demographics. 
While abiding to new ideas of romance, intimacy, and women’s role in the family and society, the 
women also aim to act out the hierarchical gender model in their selection of a spouse. The same 
 variety of symbolic resources that creates this dilemma also comes to the aid of individuals when 
they try to resolve it. When the Béarn bachelors encountered the changing marriage market, they 
found no other solution but to stay unmarried. The cultural model for marriage that the bachelors 
failed to act out was preserved in their non-marriage. The Chinese ‘leftover women’ can develop 
more varied strategies, and the student migrants among them draw from their cosmopolitan field, 
orientation and resources. Before discussing these strategies, let me outline the ideal model for a 
good marriage match, which is shared by the urban youth to a striking degree. 
Good wives, good husbands 
Now lets sit back at Helen’s table at the dating event. Confidently she lists her requirements for a 
potential husband: he should have a good family background, at least a master’s degree and be tall. 
He should earn a monthly salary of at least 20.000 CNY and own a house and a car. It is difficult to 
find a man who meets all of Helen’s requirements, but she cannot settle for less because of her own 
background and status. She herself owns a car and an apartment, and has a monthly salary of 10.000 
CNY. Her parents are highly educated, a university professor and an engineer. She wants to find a 
husband whose background and current situation are better than hers. Being over 30, Helen realises 
that many men already consider her too old for marriage. To add to the pressure, her parents 
constantly worry about her situation and urge her to get married soon. After seven years of studying 
and working in Australia, Helen has recently returned to Beijing. She explains that the need to find 
a husband was one of the main reasons for her return. Not willing to marry a non-Chinese, she 
thinks she will have a much better chance of finding a Chinese man of her high standards in Beijing 
where the level of education and income is generally high, than among the Chinese in Australia. 
Her search is a time-consuming effort, in the two months that she has been a member of the 
Touyuan agency, she has taken part in ten such events as today’s, has been on several individual 
 dates, and has communicated with potential matches via email and mobile chat. 
I catch a moment with Mr Wang, the busy manager of the Touyuan agency. Showing me the lists of 
personal information his customers fill up upon joining, and explaining their most common 
requirements, he confirms the impression I have already got during my fieldwork. The ideas about 
what makes a good wife and a good husband are strikingly uniform in contemporary urban China. 
The same list of objective standards recurs in discussions with student migrants, their parents and 
other urban youth, and in TV shows, pop songs and internet discussion forums. When choosing a 
spouse, the main considerations are (in random order): family background, occupation, education, 
income, ownership of a house and a car, age, appearance and personal character. Even though the 
list is the same for both women and men, the attributes have gendered content and they are 
differently emphasised by women and men, as well as by the parents. While parents emphasise the 
importance of similar family background, many young people consider it advantageous but in 
importance well below the more personal attributes of the potential spouse, such as his or her 
income and education level. That is, apart from the family’s place of origin (rural vs. urban, interior 
vs. coast, big city vs. medium city), which is considered to greatly influence an individual’s outlook 
and habits. Women emphasise income and assets, while men value beauty. Occupation is linked to 
income, but also to other characteristics desirable in a spouse. Stable jobs, such as positions in 
teaching or state owned enterprises, were mentioned as good for women because they leave more 
time and energy to be devoted for the family. For men, challenging jobs in the private business 
sector with good prospects to increase earnings were thought particularly good.  
In this model we can see the traditional rationale for conjugal exchanges, in which material care 
mainly flows from husband to wife, and reproductive care mainly from wife to husband. 
Nevertheless this is not a model determined by some timeless cultural rationale, but clearly shaped 
by the current emphasis on the individual over family (Kleinman et al. 2011; Rofel 2007; Whyte 
2003; Yan 2009). This cultural logic of marriage does not quite work in the current marriage 
 market, or more precisely, at its top end, the highly educated urban population. When looking at the 
continuum of the marriage market, we can see that it is the very mobility of women in general that 
leaves the ‘leftover women’ unprotected in the marriage market. 
Considering the high sex ratio in China and the accounts of women’s increasing power in marriage 
negotiations (Chang 2013; Yan 2009), it may seem surprising that among the educated urban youth, 
I found a strong sentiment that it is the men who have more choice in the marriage market. While 
young women often worried about finding a good husband, men of the same age group told me that 
they had more choice and more time than women, and thus needed not compromise on their 
demands. Women’s demands, in their view, were mere hopes and if they stuck to them for too long, 
there was a risk that no man would want them.  
Bourdieu (2007) argues that the non-marriage of the Béarn bachelors resulted from the 
disintegration of the protective economic and value mechanisms of the marriage market, exposing it 
to the anarchy of individual lovers’ choice (2007:173). In China, the marriage market was protected 
by the value principle of patriarchy and the economic principle of patriliny (enacted in living 
arrangements and inheritance). The family planning policies disrupted this logic. As the ideal of 
women's hypergamy is still in place, women in areas with high sex ratio simply have more choice 
and migrate to more desirable locations for marriage. Those left unprotected in this upward 
circulation of women, are of course the men at the bottom and women at the top of the hierarchy. 
Apart from this basic rationale, there are some other factors that contribute to the tensions at the 
urban end of the marriage market. 
The main bridewealth in urban China is ‘the house’, usually meaning an apartment. On the current 
property market, its acquirement has, however, become almost impossible to many young men and 
their parents. At the time of my fieldwork, the Bureau of Statistics of the Beijing Municipality 
reported a 27:1 price-to-income ratio, 5 times the world average (China Building Industry 
Association and Committee of Commerce and Tourism 2010). The Chinese Academy of Social 
 Sciences (2009) estimated that 85 per cent of urban residents could not afford to buy a house at the 
current market. Despite these adverse conditions, all my informants agreed that a newly married 
couple needed a house, strongly preferring this to living with the in-laws or renting. As the families 
with daughters do not need to save money for the marriage of sons, many have the ability to share 
the financial burden of starting a marriage. In these conditions, many young women and their 
parents still hold the ideal that the groom should provide the house and the car upon marriage, but 
are aware that in reality it will require some input from both families. The one child policy and the 
property market bubble in urban China thus contribute to a situation where urban families with sons 
can expect the bride’s family to share the financial burden of marriage. The daughters of urban 
single-child families are thus not benefiting from the increase of women’s power in the marriage 
negotiations to the same degree as their, in many other respects more disadvantaged, rural 
counterparts.  
Finally, the gender model that informs ideas about appropriate age for marriage, works as a further 
check against the power of women in the marriage market. The educated urban youth in this study 
were very consistent in their opinions about the ideal age for themselves and their partner at the 
time of marriage, namely, mid-20s for women and around 30 for men. The explanations men gave 
to the preference for younger women were their physical beauty, simple (jiandan) minds and lack of 
status and power (quanli) that tend to increase with age. The age bias works in men’s favour in the 
marriage market, as they can find a spouse in their own age cohort or in the next one, but women’s 
best window is limited to their twenties.  
The ideal gender model for marriage is difficult to enact in contemporary China, particularly so for 
the ‘leftover women and men’. Now we get to the interesting question of what the ‘leftover 
women’, more specifically the student migrants among them, do when they face the disparity 
between the ideal and the real conditions. First, there are two qualities that can be emphasised to 
compensate when the partner or the relationship falls short of the ideal. These draw from the two 
 central aspects of the subjectivity of the urban youth, desire and enterprising. The latter is realised 
through the quality of nengli, which means ability, potential and ambition, a conveniently vague 
term to be adapted in various circumstances. For example, facing the reality of having to participate 
in financing the house and the car upon marriage, women and their parents emphasised that a man’s 
nengli was more important than his current assets. Romantic love, a reflection of the desiring 
subject that is expressed through affects that centre around the individual (Rofel 2007), also 
mediates the gap between the ideal model and the reality.  
The grown emphasis of both of these qualities is part of the unification of the symbolic markets. 
This process should not be viewed simply in terms of the adaptation of Western ideas of 
individuality, sexuality and romance, and rejecting Chinese social norms. Individual desire is very 
much part of the particularly Chinese subjectivity of the student migrants, and has its origins in the 
current politico-economic conditions as well as in the collectivist era. The retreated welfare state 
and the unequally distributed wealth and opportunity that have given rise to the self-interested, 
enterprising individuals encouraged to express identities through consumption, have accelerated the 
sociocultural transformations that were already under way before the reforms, such as the ‘romantic 
revolution’ (Yan 2003). It is from this background, as well as from the symbolic resources drawn 
from their cosmopolitan encounters, that the student migrants draw from when contesting and 
negotiating the Chinese models for gender and romantic and sexual relationships.  
Love 
In Béarn the unification of symbolic markets was largely a one-directional process of the urban way 
of life replacing the peasant values. But the idea of romantic love among the student migrants and 
the urban youth in general shows that what has taken place in China is not a replacement of Chinese 
values with the Western ones, but a unification that combines ideas and values from different 
 sources. The idealisation of romantic love has a long history in China, elaborated in the works of art 
and literature through different dynasties. Songs, stories and popular tales also served as cautionary 
tales, to warn people about the tension between love, which was considered an individual desire, 
and social obligation, such as filial duty. A common theme was thus the ability of romantic love to 
inflict suffering on those involved (Jankowiak 1995). In contemporary China, individual desire is an 
accepted, or even a required, part of a properly modern and cosmopolitan identity, but at the same 
time, the tension between that desire and social obligation remains, as can be seen in the 
negotiations between parents and children about dating and marriage.  
The current idea of romance has been influenced by American popular culture, which emphasises 
public displays of affection in speech and behaviour that are not overtly sexual (Jankowiak 1995). 
Informants used the word romantic (langman de) when referring to these Western forms of 
behaviour, for example, giving gifts, arranging surprises and talking about love. Other words (often 
love, ai, and care, guanxin) were used when talking about more traditional Chinese ways of 
expressing affection in a romantic relationship, which include paying interest to the small details of 
each others’ daily activities, being concerned over each other’s health and well being, and 
accompanying each other in activities. Many women considered ‘foreigners’, in this context 
referring to white Euro-Americans, as the model for romantic behaviour and attitude that Chinese 
men should learn from. 
These two ideas of love and romance are combined in the TV-dramas, films and pop music 
produced in Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and in the recent years most notably, South Korea (Chua 
and Iwabuchi 2008). The young in this study had little interest in Chinese TV, sanctioned by the 
State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT). Instead, they downloaded and 
watched shows from the internet, or bought cheap DVDs from street corners. The Korean TV-
dramas often show a beautiful, kind-hearted woman of no wealth and status to overcome the 
obstacles of parental disapproval and class prejudice to be with her true love, an heir of a rich, 
 notable family, who expresses his love by grand romantic gestures. The traditional East Asian 
themes of romantic love: suffering, filiality and destiny, are combined with the current 
cosmopolitan themes of overseas study, premarital sex, cohabitance, homosexuality and so on, in a 
setting that is utterly desirable, modern and cosmopolitan.  
Romance in its overt, dramatic forms was greatly idealised and appreciated by my young 
informants. Grand gestures were used to express and evoke romantic feelings especially at the early 
days of a relationship. Jonatan, a good singer and a piano player, arranged a surprise for a woman 
he had been dating for a while. On the Gregorian New Year’s Eve, he took her to a bar that had live 
music. Jonatan got on stage to serenade to the woman and handed her 33 red roses. The meaning of 
the number, as he explained, was that as three roses carried the message ‘I love you’, 33 meant that 
they would be together forever. Another informant, a 21 year old student, approached the girl he 
liked by inviting her to a classroom in the evening. He decorated the room with candles and 
flowers, arranging them to the shape of her name. In front of a group of their friends, whom he had 
invited to witness the occasion, he asked her to be his girlfriend. Overwhelmed by this romantic 
gesture, she happily accepted.  
Young urban couples are not shy to physically show their affection in public. Couples holding 
hands, kissing, embracing, sitting on each others’ laps, cutting each other’s nails, combing hair, 
correcting make up or clothes and making other similar intimate gestures are a common sight in the 
public spaces of Beijing. Both students and their parents attributed the increase of public displays of 
affection to ‘learning from the West’ during the past decade or two. Chinese students in secondary 
education are strongly discouraged against dating by their parents and teachers. At this time, 
nothing should interfere with their focus on study, which is ensured by almost constant supervision 
by the school and the parents. Of course the more rebellious and the less studious youth find the 
time and opportunities for dating, but most of the students only start dating after they finish high 
school. Away from their parents’ supervision, with a great deal more unstructured time in their 
 hands than before, informal socialising and dating becomes an important part of the university 
experience. Dating relationships are intense and intimate. Couples I knew spent most of their free 
time together and showed great interest in each others’ well-being and everyday activities. There 
are few private spaces available for students, who live in single-sex dormitories, sharing a room 
with up to twelve others. Couples loiter at public spaces or go to the hourly paid hotels near 
university campuses for more privacy. Others rent a room or an apartment together outside campus, 
usually without the knowledge of their parents who live in a different city. Cohabitance before 
marriage is disapproved by many parents. The young couples are reluctant to openly act against 
their parents’ wishes, but the fact that many students leave their hometowns to study and to work, 
only seeing their parents once or twice a year, facilitates non-compliance without direct conflict.  
The youth autonomy in spouse selection increased rapidly after the 1950s in both rural and urban 
China (Jankowiak 1993, 1995; Parish and Whyte 1978; Yan 2003). Even though it is extremely rare 
these days for marriages to take place against the will of the young couple, parental involvement in 
the process prevails. Several of my informants stressed that it would be very difficult for a couple to 
stay together without the approval of the parents of both sides. I did not know any couples, dating or 
married, who were together despite parents’ direct opposition. Jonatan’s romantic gesture at the bar 
did not have the outcome he had hoped for. The woman’s mother saw Jonatan walk her daughter 
out while she waited in the car outside the bar that night. The next day the woman called Jonatan, 
saying that her mother had asked questions about him, and disapproved the relationship. Jonatan 
worked for his father’s business and the mother thought that businessmen were unreliable. She also 
thought Jonatan was too short for her daughter and they did not look good together. In a tear-filled 
meeting the couple agreed not to meet anymore. Jonatan often emphasised the stress and anxiety 
that surrounded dating. The difficulty, in his view, was not to find a woman he liked, but to gain the 
approval of his and her parents. The importance of parents’ opinion was not only due to filial 
obligation, but his financial dependence on them. Abiding to the ideal model, Jonatan explained the 
 a man was expected to provide a house and a car upon marriage, but the astronomical sums required 
for these assets force men to depend on their parents for assistance. If his parents did not like his 
girlfriend, they simply would not pay for the house, the car and the wedding. Jonatan’s mother 
explained to me that it was the duty of the parents to help their child to make a good choice, a 
woman who would be good to him and to the whole family. She thus planned to pay close attention 
to the background and the personality of any woman Jonatan was to introduce.  
Delaying the introduction between boyfriend or girlfriend and the parents is a common practice in 
China. Couples can date for several years before meeting each others’ parents. For many, the 
motivation is that they do not want to involve the parents before an engagement and marriage is 
planned. For some, however, it is a strategy against parental disapproval. Of the couples I knew, 
those who had formed relationships against conventions of age and status and expected opposition 
hoped that the endurance of their relationship would prove its value to the parents. The parents’ 
opinion is important in the process of partner selection, but the youth are not completely without 
strategies were they to disapprove. From the young people’s perspective, an agreement needs to be 
reached with the parents, but some are more willing than others to test its boundaries, as will be 
shown below.  
Sex 
Another field where the unification on symbolic markets is taking place is sex and sexuality (Zhang 
2011). In the midst of rapid transition, attitudes and practices range on a wide scale. A 2006 survey 
covering both rural and urban districts of Shanghai shows a significant change even within a short 
time span of nine years. The respondents were divided into two age cohorts (16-19 and 20-28), 
which were then compared in terms of the percentage of females and males who had experienced 
dating, fondling and coitus before the age of 18. Across the rural and urban, male and female 
 categories, all these behaviours nearly or more than doubled between the older and the younger 
cohorts (Zabin et al. 2009). None of my young urban informants disapproved premarital sex, but 
their attitudes, knowledge on the subject and experiences ranged between two extremes. At one end 
were the informants who only wanted to have sex with a person they planned to marry. Some of 
these informants had very little knowledge about the technicalities of sex or contraception. A few 
used our conversations to ask questions on the topic. They found the subject embarrassing, but felt 
able to ask questions either because I was older and married, or because I was Western and 
therefore presumably open (kaifang) in my thinking.  
At the other extreme were the informants who had curious or unabashed attitudes toward sex. They 
engaged in sex relationships that did not involve emotional commitment. Kate, a 26 year old 
returnee had sex relationships with various men, including her ex-boyfriend, a married friend and a 
middle-aged businessman, while at the same time dating men she would potentially want to marry. 
Her arrangement with the businessman is an example of a much publicised practice of young 
women, often students, having sexual relationships with older men, businessmen and government 
officials, in exchange for material benefits. These arrangements are referred to as being a kept 
mistress (baoyang/baoernai), living off a rich man (bang dakuan), and compensated dating 
(yuanzhu jiaoji). They are usually long-term arrangements and the terms are negotiated between the 
two individuals. In contrast to more direct forms of prostitution that are solicited on the streets, in 
hair saloons, karaoke bars and restaurants, the compensation is often given through sponsoring an 
apartment or giving material gifts rather than giving money. Kate had no formal agreement with the 
man, but upon their mutual understanding, she occasionally accompanied him on business dinners 
and he visited her in her apartment for sex, and in exchange he bought her designer clothes and 
other expensive gifts. She saw this relationship as a harmless experience that could offer some 
excitement and material gain, but would have no significant impact on her future, including her 
marriage plans. The attitudes and the experiences of most informants fell somewhere in between 
 these two extremes. They had some knowledge about the subject of sex, discussed it with close 
friends, and considered sex a natural part of a love relationship, both during dating and marriage.  
The openness of attitudes toward sex did not follow gender lines, both male and female informants 
ranged from the conservative to the liberal extremes. Yet ideas about proper sexual behaviour and 
how it links to the existential characteristics of a woman and man were gendered. Xiao Wei, a 21 
year old male student, who had had various sexual partners and had dated a woman who was 
previously a kept mistress to a businessman, said that he could not consider marriage with her, or a 
woman with many sexual partners. He believed that he would make a good husband in the future, 
because his sexual experiences would help him to ‘know what he likes’ and he would no longer 
have interest in other women. In contrast, a woman with similar experiences would not make a good 
wife, because she would no longer be a good woman. Both men and women used the patriarchal 
discourse to explain that the differential and hierarchical gender roles originated in the Chinese 
cultural ideology, history and traditions. But while the men cited the cultural traditions to articulate 
their own views, women used them to explain the expectations the society and men have on women. 
Even when acting in accordance with these expectations, they did not fully adapt them as their own. 
Kate hoped to eventually settle down with a wealthy man. Despite her various sexual relationships 
with men, single and married, her idealisation of marriage included fidelity, but only from her side. 
She explained her double standard for fidelity in marriage with the patriarchal model. 
 
Because of the dependence. It’s just like that. I think it’s like that, men are supposed to 
be strong and hard, women are supposed to be soft. So women can rely on men and men 
will take care of them. So I think, if women can rely on men, then men can have some 
privileges. [Laughs surprised] It sounds so strange! When I explain it like this, I think, 
what a strange idea! 
 
 Kate’s confused statement shows that she is aware of the patriarchal discourse and cites it 
 with relative distance, without internalising it in full. Kate is a daughter of two high level cadres, 
her family is wealthy and well connected. They were able to buy Kate an apartment at the 
prestigious part of the city, and supported her extravagant lifestyle. Kate herself earned a starting 
salary of 10.000 CNY at a job she had started only recently. Her wealthy background and good job 
did not mean Kate would forfeit the ideal of hypergamous marriage. On the contrary, her number 
one requirement was that the husband should be able to bear the full responsibility of the family 
finances, offering the lifestyle that Kate was accustomed to and Kate’s own assets and earnings 
would be a mere bonus. In return, she would be a loyal wife and allow her husband ‘privileges’. 
This is what Kandiyoti (Kandiyoti 1997) calls a ‘patriarchal bargain’, men paying money to buy 
their wives’ loyalty and silence about extramarital affairs, and women trading their positions for 
financial security.  
It is notable that all female informants who had particularly liberal views on sex and sexuality were 
returned student migrants. This was not the case for male informants. Moreover, most of these 
women claimed that staying abroad had had a significant impact on their views. They did not link 
the change to having lived in a sexually more liberal society, but to the experience of increased 
independence. Surviving on their own abroad had made them more self-assured and less concerned 
with other people’s opinions. This shows that there is more to the transformation of the marriage 
market than the introduction of new symbolic goods through actual, virtual and imaginary travel. 
With their individual journeys, the student migrants’ positioning in the hierarchies of generation, 
kinship, gender, etc., shift (Mahler and Pessar 2001), and many experience an increased sense of 
autonomy from these power systems. In addition, the cosmopolitan orientation and competency 
(Vertovec and Cohen 2002) they develop, helps them to situationally treat cultures as ‘artworks’ 
(Hannerz 1990), view them from the distance (Szerszynski and Urry 2006) and compare them.  
Finally, several students in this study felt that the spatial and social distance from parents that 
emerges via migration, gave them an opportunity to live openly as homosexuals. This was a major 
 motivator to extend one's stay abroad, or to choose a country and a city of study where the family 
had no previous connections. While many women PhD students worried about not being able to 
find a suitable husband, for some gay women embarking on a doctorate study had the advantage of 
not having to deal with the parental pressure to marry for a few more years. None of the gay 
informants in this study had openly discussed their sexuality with their parents, and none of them 
expected their parents to approve of a same-sex relationship. While not a permanent solution, 
spatial mobility temporally enabled non-compliance without direct conflict.  
The cosmopolitan orientation and competencies, the geography of power, the emphasis on romantic 
love and nengli, and the new symbolic resources adapted from abroad, are all part of the 
experiences of the student migrants as they negotiate their difficult position in the marriage market. 
Their courses of action can be categorised as compromises, non-compliance and engaging in the 
marriage markets of other countries.  
Compromises 
Compromising on either romantic love or on the objective standards was the most common strategy 
of the student migrants I knew who were not able to find a spouse to match their ideal. Kate and 
Nelly both had Chinese boyfriends while studying abroad, but broke up with them upon returning to 
China. Kate met her boyfriend in Holland where the two studied and lived together for three years. 
After earning their bachelor’s degrees, they took different directions, Kate going to UK to study for 
a master’s degree, and her boyfriend enrolling in a university in Amsterdam. As Kate returned to 
Beijing to work, her boyfriend found a job at a multinational IT company in Amsterdam. On Kate’s 
account, the two never officially ended their relationship, but in addition to her sex relationships 
with various men, she also dated men with the objective of finding a husband. When I first got to 
know Kate, she viewed the prospect of marrying her university boyfriend with disdain. She claimed 
 that their relationship lacked passion and feeling, and hoped to passionately fall in love with a man 
who would also meet her objective requirements of wealth and success. Kate’s university boyfriend, 
on the other hand, seemed more interested in maintaining the relationship and directing it towards 
marriage. He came to visit Kate in Beijing, but she went out with friends, only returning to her 
apartment in the morning after he had left for the airport. He suggested that he would arrange a 
transfer to the company’s Shanghai office, and asked Kate to move there with him. Kate refused on 
the excuse that she liked Beijing more and all her friends lived there. She told me that the real 
reason was that she liked her ‘single life’ in Beijing, and did not want to marry him. Despite 
avoiding intimacy and finding excuses against his attempts to move the relationship forward, Kate 
did not completely end the relationship. Fulfilling all of Kate’s objective criteria for a good 
husband, he was her backup plan, in case she failed to find a man of similar attributes but also 
mutual attraction. A few years later, after various relationships of both sexual and romantic nature, 
which had left her disillusioned with love and romance as a basis of relationships, Kate was starting 
to seriously consider marriage with her university boyfriend. ‘I am a materialistic and practical 
person’, she explained,‘I like to enjoy life, so I pursue a stable and secure lifestyle.’  
Nelly made a different choice. She had met her boyfriend while an undergraduate in China. When 
Nelly went abroad for two years to study for a masters’ degree, the couple stayed together with the 
plan to marry upon her return. The parents of the couple met for negotiations, and the boyfriends’ 
family bought an apartment and a car in preparation for the marriage. But the time abroad had a 
profound impact on Nelly, and when she returned, she wanted to cancel the marriage plans. Unlike 
Kate, who had sought comfort and security from a relationship while studying abroad, citing that as 
her main motivation to stay with her boyfriend, Nelly grew more independent, outgoing and open-
minded. While abroad, Kate mainly socialised with other Chinese students, spent most of her time 
with her boyfriend and relied on him in taking care of practicalities. Nelly, in contrast, actively 
engaged with the surrounding student community and the local society by making friends, attending 
 parties, adapting new ideas, style of dress, and ways of interacting with people. But upon returning 
to China, it was Kate whose quest to find a new relationship was motivated by the desire for 
symbolic goods associated with the West: romantic and sexual passion. Nelly’s separation from her 
boyfriend was motivated by the Chinese cultural logic of a good match. Having increased her nengli 
through self-development, she felt, in line with the hierarchical gender model, that her boyfriend’s 
attributes no longer matched, let alone surpassed, hers. Against the wishes of her boyfriend and the 
parents of both of them, Nelly ended the relationship. 
During the following three years, Nelly dated several men and often agonised over the difficulty of 
finding a decent man with whom she ‘had feeling’ with. She then started to like a man, a friend’s 
friend, who did not match half of her requirements. Having quit his career in business to take care 
of his parents, he owned a small shop for selling his own artwork. ‘The feeling together is very 
good, but he has no money! That’s the only problem!’ Nelly lamented upon meeting him. After 
some time of dating, Nelly concluded that the man’s nengli was high and he had simply become a 
victim of unfortunate circumstances of his parents’ illness. After a year together, the two got 
married without any marriage transactions taking place, with the reluctant approval of Nelly’s 
parents. They moved to a rented flat in the outskirts of Beijing. As the husband’s mother passed 
away and his father's health improved, he was able to devote more time to develop his skills as a 
carver, and his shop and online store started running better. Nelly took a job as a manager for an IT 
outsourcing company, which she could partly do from home office. In Nelly’s words, she has grown 
more mature and is willing to work together with her husband to build a good life, as long as the 
feeling between them is good. 
Kate and Nelly’s experiences show the complexity of the ways cosmopolitan subjectivity is 
enacted. The lifestyles and the degree of integration while abroad does not predict the way students 
live and make decisions once they return to China. Both Nelly and Kate claimed that the experience 
of studying abroad had influenced their values and personalities. Nelly linked her process of self-
 development directly to adapting new ideas and ways of behaving while abroad. Her marriage 
appears to match the Western ideal of a ‘pure relationship’ (Giddens 1992) better than Kate’s 
planned marriage to her university boyfriend. But Nelly articulated her decision to break off her 
first engagement in terms of the Chinese logic of a good match. She also drew from it when 
rationalising the new relationship, deciding that the man’s nengli and the love between them were 
enough to compensate for his shortcomings on the objective criteria. 
The migration experience attached Kate more strongly to the Chinese sociocultural field, as she 
came to realise that she was most comfortable working, dating and socialising in a culturally, 
socially and linguistically Chinese environment. But her attachment was now a choice, and the way 
she reattached herself was influenced by her cosmopolitan experience. She contrasted her party 
lifestyle with the boring life in Europe. Getting drunk at the clubs, having sex relations without 
emotional attachment and in exchange for material compensation, and dating married men went 
against social norms in China. Kate nevertheless viewed them as specifically Chinese ways of 
acting. She therefore did not account these behaviours to ‘learning from the West’, but on the 
contrary, explained them with the practical nature of the Chinese society, and herself being a 
Chinese person. What she did account to her cosmopolitan experience, however, was her courage to 
engage in such behaviours. Student migrants thus not only introduce new symbolic goods to the 
Chinese sociocultural field, but also engage in already existing modes of behaviour, which they 
would have avoided before their migrant experience. Bruce Robbins (1998) has noted that 
cosmopolitanism is not a mode of detachment, but of attachment and reattachment, multiple 
attachment, and attachment at a distance (Robbins 1998:3). As the student migrants attach to the 
Chinese sociocultural field, their cosmopolitan existence becomes part of it. 
 Non-compliance 
Some returnees question the cultural models for gender and marriage altogether and have 
relationships that are in a clear conflict with them. Nelly’s best friend, Sarah, was one of them. 
While Nelly dated men with the objective of finding a husband, Sarah was not interested in 
marriage. When I first met Sarah, I asked if she had a boyfriend. ‘No’, she laughed, ‘I don’t have 
boyfriends, I have lovers.’ Similarly to Kate, Sarah maintained several sex relationships at the same 
time, one of them with an Austrian man she met regularly when travelling to Europe for business. 
Unlike Kate, Sarah did not see this as a passing stage of experimenting before finding a culturally 
sanctioned match for marriage.  
The only time she seriously considered marriage was when one of her sex partners of several years 
proposed to her. The two had grown emotionally attached, and the man wanted to either get married 
or to end the relationship. A hairdresser eight years her junior, his status was below Sarah’s by all 
standards from age to education, occupation, income and family background. These ill-matched 
characteristics prompted Sarah’s friends to advice against the marriage. Sarah also knew that she 
would have her work carved out in trying to gain her parents’ approval. After pondering the 
situation for months, she finally decided against the marriage. In our discussions during this time, 
Sarah’s main concern seemed not to be the differences in qualifications and income. She 
emphasised his nengli, and said that despite the differences, they had similar views and 
personalities. Sarah felt that socioeconomic mobility through marriage was the strategy of women 
who came from disadvantaged backgrounds, or did not have nengli. Her own success rendered her 
free to choose a spouse by other than material considerations. By this, Sarah clearly rejected the 
cultural model of gender hierarchy. But she showed her awareness of it in her considerations of the 
age difference. Sarah worried that even though the age difference did not seem a problem now, it 
would become such in the years to come. ‘When I’m 40, he’ll be 32. I’ll be old and he’ll still be 
 attractive. Many girls will flirt with him, and I will have to worry about it. I don’t want that.’ Even 
though Sarah rejected the gender model that values men’s higher status and women’s youth and 
beauty, it was part of her subjectivity, influencing her motivations and anxieties in the decision 
making. After her decision, Sarah did not start to search for a better matching candidate for 
marriage. At the age of 34, she is still unmarried.  
The couples I knew whose relationships strongly conflicted the cultural gender model, experienced 
immense pressure from their friends and families. Many gave in eventually, ending the relationship. 
The practice of delaying the introduction between the parents and the dating partner for several 
years allows the youth to push the boundaries of cultural norms. But crossing them by marriage is 
another matter, and for most these relationships remain experiences of the youth, before a more 
‘mature’ choice is made for marriage. The physical distance created by migration somewhat 
changes this dynamic. As the students’ immediate living environment is controlled by different 
social norms, they feel less pressure to follow the Chinese conventions. Even after returning to 
China, the cosmopolitan orientation allows some student migrants to maintain some distance to the 
local power systems. 
Dating and marrying non-Chinese 
Marrying a non-Chinese is one of the cosmopolitan strategies of the ‘leftover women’. Social 
mobility through marriage across national borders has its roots in the traditional practice of 
women’s spatial hypergamy in China. In patrilocal societies, where the bride has to adapt to the new 
living conditions after marriage, it is logical to aspire to marry to a location that is similar or more 
desirable than the natal place (Oxfeld 2005:19). In the reform years, the distances travelled for 
marriage have grown and brides increasingly cross provincial and national borders. ‘Marriage 
scapes’ that link fantasies of gender, race, sexuality and modernity with certain sites, have formed 
 (Constable 2005b). For the student migrants, the most desirable destinations for study are also the 
most desirable sources of non-Chinese marriage partners. Women’s wish to marry a foreigner is 
linked to both, the project of finding a husband of higher status by objective standards, and to the 
cosmopolitan desires that equate foreign men with romance, freedom, independence, progress and 
modernity.  
The nationality and race of foreigners at times overrides other objective standards in the marriage 
market hierarchy. Economic wealth, global political power, cultural heritage, natural environment, 
civil society, social welfare and crime rate are among the indicators of development that are used to 
rank countries. For example, while US is considered to be at the top in terms of global economic 
and political influence, some European countries are valued for relatively clean environment, safe 
cities or rich cultural heritage. Apart from nationality, race is a marker of status. The Chinese 
discourse of race, in both its scientific and folk forms, is based on the lineage model and a racial 
hierarchy where the ‘white and yellow races’ are placed above the ‘brown, black and red races’, in 
competition with each other (Dikötter 1997). A citizenship of a developed country and a ‘white’ 
racial status can sometimes compensate for the other objective criteria when a Chinese woman 
marries a man whose status in his home country does not match her high status in China. It must be 
noted that the value of these assets seems to be in decline with the expansion of China’s global 
economic and political power, and the increased prevalence of cosmopolitan encounters of its 
young urbanites. Foreign men are increasingly assessed by the same standards as the Chinese men. 
Many of the young, highly educated women who had plans or experience of living abroad told me 
that they were not interested in dating the foreigners in China, who were mostly young drifters, 
language teachers with no proper careers, or old divorced men looking for young beautiful wives, 
all of low social and economic status in their home countries. This shows that the unification of the 
symbolic markets is a constant process, and the value attached to symbolic goods (here nationality 
and race) continues to evolve as they become more integrated into the local symbolic market, and 
 moreover, as the unification of economic markets develops. 
Marrying white Euro-Americans has been a practice of Chinese women rather than men (Constable 
2005b). One explanation is the racial discourse in the West that feminises Asian men, rendering 
them undesirable partners (Mahler and Pessar 2006:38). Another perspective is given by Bourdieu 
(2007), who argues that objective attachment to a place creates subjective attachment to its culture 
(habits, lifestyles, fashion, etc.). In the case of China, there is no doubt that the patrilineal 
institutions have attached men more strongly than women to their home places. But does this hold 
for the student migrants, the sons and daughters of the urban single-child families? In the light of 
my research, much of the importance of the patrilineal institutions has waned. But at the same time, 
patriliny and its complement patriarchy remain powerful discourses, and I found that male student 
migrants used them alongside the racial discourse to rationalise why they themselves or Chinese 
men in general did not want to marry foreigners. Chinese women were described as more adaptable 
to new customs and skilful in languages and thus able to have successful cross-cultural marriages. 
On the flip side, men often told me that because of the higher status of men in Chinese society, the 
women had less to lose if they married a foreigner. If a man married a woman of high racial, 
national and economic status, he would feel great pressure to retain an appropriately high status to 
ensure a well balanced marriage. A woman, on the other hand, did not have to compete with her 
non-Chinese husband, but could climb up on the socioeconomic ladder through marriage. Men 
preferred to use this discourse rather than the racial one, which they were also aware of. Even 
though very few used the racial discourse as a primary explanation of why they did not want to 
marry foreigners, some commented that finding a foreign girlfriend would be difficult, that they 
would not dare to approach foreign women, or that dating a foreign woman would ‘give face’. 
Bourdieu gives another conceptual tool that helps to understand why the cross-cultural marriage 
still remains mainly a women’s strategy. He argues that the force of attraction the new sociocultural 
field exerts and the force of inertia of different agents against it varies according to their attachment 
 to the old field (2007:171–3). There are at least two factors that can increase the force of attraction 
the cross-border marriages and permanent settlement abroad have on female student migrants more 
than on the male student migrants. These are the Chinese job market and the marriage market. The 
gendered job market not only pushes women toward certain, less prestigious occupations, but also 
limits their upward mobility (Broaded and Liu 1996; Li and Zhang 2010; Wang and Cai 2008; 
Xiang and Shen 2009). The logic of the marriage market, in which women circulate upwards, drives 
the women at the top to extend their field across national borders, importantly, to countries higher 
up in the geography of desire. 
As I have noted, male student migrants tended to articulate their choices, pressures, and concerns in 
terms of filial obligations more than the female student migrants. The question of the continuity of 
their stronger attachment to the old field through the patrilineal institutions and ideals is thus 
difficult, and in need of more research. Indicative of this complexity, or even change, are my survey 
results. The surveys included a set of questions about the students’ attitudes towards dating and 
marrying foreigners. To my great surprise, in both surveys (the Renmin sample of the aspiring 
student migrants, and the current student migrants at the LSE) men showed more positive attitudes 
than women. In all categories (dating a foreigner, marrying a foreigner, dating an ethnically Chinese 
foreigner, marrying an ethnically Chinese foreigner), a larger percentage of men than women 
responded ‘willing’ or ‘very willing’. Even though their practices do not currently match the 
attitudes, these results contest the image of the unadaptable Chinese man who is concerned with the 
racial purity of the lineage and resistant to cultural adaptation. 
One thing these results suggest is that men feel that factors that are not controlled by themselves 
render cross-cultural relationships difficult. The racial discourse is of course one of them, and even 
though seldom used by men when talking about dating and marriage, discrimination in general was 
one of the central concerns for male student migrants. For example, some men gave their 
disadvantaged position in racial hierarchies as a major reason to return to China after graduation. 
 Female student migrants, in contrast, did not show much concern over discrimination. Men’s higher 
gender and kinship status in China results in a greater decline of status through migration, than what 
women experience. To the men, their positioning in the Chinese gender and kinship hierarchies was 
significant to their experience of status abroad. In contrast, women primarily articulated their status 
abroad in terms of their positioning in the local hierarchies of gender and race. In this context, the 
hypersexualisation of the Asian women, or in the words of my informants, ‘the popularity of 
Chinese women in the West’, was interpreted positively. 
Nevertheless, the results also suggest an ongoing change. As the cosmopolitan encounters of the 
young Chinese men become more prevalent, the significance of the idea of the asexualised Chinese 
man in the West (Mahler and Pessar 2006:38) decreases as its place is taken by other competing 
discourses, ideas and personal experiences. In fact, this racial discourse was rejected by those male 
informants who had dated foreign women. These men were still an exception among the student 
migrants, often those whose parents had sent them abroad at a young age for secondary education. 
Wang was one of them. Having dated several foreign women both in China and in the US, he 
claimed that the reason why romantic and sexual relationships between Chinese student migrant 
men and White Euro-American women were still relatively rare, was not the prejudice of the 
women, but the misconceptions and the lack of confidence of the Chinese men. 
Conclusion 
The conflict in the Chinese marriage market results from the tension between cultural ideas of 
gender and the new social practices. The high sex ratio, changed family composition, increased 
investment in daughters’ education and economic inequality all contribute to the situation where 
large numbers of men and women have difficulties finding a spouse. Being high achieving women 
with exposure to a variety of cultural ideas about sexual and romantic relations, marriage is not a 
 simple matter for the female student migrants. Their gendered positioning in the marriage market 
renders the men who meet their objective standards relatively few. Complicating the matter is their 
desire for a relationship with romantic and sexual intimacy. They are free to go about the search for 
a husband on their own, but know that the approval of the parents needs to be gained eventually. 
The complexity of this dynamic justifies the question of how anyone actually manages to marry. 
But unlike the Béarn bachelors, the Chinese student migrants do get married. This suggests two 
things. First, these women have more room to manoeuvre and more varied strategies at their 
disposal than the Béarn bachelors. They draw from the enterprising and the desiring part of their 
subjectivities to emphasise nengli and romantic love to compensate the falling short of the ideal 
model for marriage. They can also engage in the dating and marriage markets of their destination 
countries. Second, the ultimate principles of primogeniture and male supremacy were preserved in 
the non-marriage of the Béarn bachelors. When the Chinese ‘leftover women’ do marry, they 
challenge the values held up in the cultural model for marriage. The challenge on patriliny and 
patriarchy is of course not new in China, but the student migrants are part of this transformation 
through their individual journeys. They draw new ideas and practices from their cosmopolitan 
encounters thus contributing to the unification of the symbolic markets. Their cosmopolitan 
orientation gives them reflexivity over different values and models that are part of their 
subjectivities. Finally, their mobility across spatial and sociocultural fields shifts their positioning in 
the geography of power, at times in ways that gives them a sense of relative autonomy from 
different systems of power.  
The Chinese marriage market is part of the student migrant subjectivity, as the cultural models for 
gender and romantic and sexual relationships are enacted in affective relationships. At the same 
time the cosmopolitan subjectivity of the student migrants becomes part of the Chinese marriage 
market and its transformation. I have shown how the cosmopolitan skills, orientation and politics 
work in particular settings of education and marriage markets. In the next chapter, I aim to explore 
 how the different aspects of cosmopolitanism are manifested in the lives of individual student 
migrants as a whole. 
